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A b s t r A c t
One of the expectations generated by the Peace Agreement signed in November 2016 between the Colombian Government and the 
FARC-EP guerrillas was to create the conditions of democratic openness that would allow the conditions for political participation of 
the opposition. As a working hypothesis it is considered that the Colombian political regime has not provided enough guarantees for 
the participation and exercise of democracy and that the current government has allowed the conditions of political, social, and armed 
conflict to be sharpened. The method of analysis adopted is interpretative and inductive, with a focus on the political participation of 
the opposition in the broad sense. The information obtained was critically analyzed considering the guarantees for the exercise of the 
opposition, freedom of expression and association and social movements. It was found that social organizations and movements have 
not achieved significant participation as an opposition and that there is a greater commitment of the now FARC political party to what 
was agreed in 2016. It is concluded that the Peace Agreement failed to provide enough guarantees for the political participation of the 
opposition and the exercise of democracy.
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Participación política de la oposición en Colombia 
después del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016
r e s u m e n
Una de las expectativas que generó el Acuerdo de Paz firmado en noviembre de 2016 entre el Gobierno colombiano y la guerrilla 
de las FARC-EP fue crear las condiciones de apertura democrática que permitan las condiciones para la participación política de la 
oposición. Como hipótesis de trabajo se considera que el régimen político colombiano no ha brindado suficientes garantías para la 
participación y el ejercicio de la democracia y que el gobierno actual ha permitido que se agudicen las condiciones del conflicto político, 
social y armado. El método de análisis adoptado es interpretativo e inductivo, con foco en la participación política de la oposición en
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sentido amplio. Se analizó críticamente la información obtenida teniendo en cuenta las garantías para el ejercicio de la oposición, libertad 
de expresión y asociación y movimientos sociales. Se encontró que las organizaciones y los movimientos sociales no han logrado una 
participación significativa como oposición y que existe un mayor compromiso del ahora partido político FARC con lo acordado en 2016. Se 
concluye que el Acuerdo de Paz no logró que el régimen político colombiano ofrezca suficientes garantías para la participación política de 
la oposición y el ejercicio de la democracia.
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Participação política da oposição na Colômbia após o 
Acordo de Paz de 2016
r e s u m o
Uma das expectativas geradas pelo Acordo de Paz assinado em novembro de 2016 entre o governo colombiano e a guerrilha das FARC-EP 
era criar condições para a abertura democrática que permitissem as condições para a participação política da oposição. Como hipótese de 
trabalho, considera-se que o regime político colombiano não forneceu garantias suficientes para a participação e o exercício da democracia e 
que o atual governo permitiu que as condições do conflito político, social e armado aumentassem. O método de análise adotado é interpretativo 
e indutivo, com foco na participação política da oposição em sentido amplo. As informações obtidas foram analisadas criticamente, levando 
em consideração as garantias para o exercício da oposição, liberdade de expressão e associação e movimentos sociais. Constatou-se que 
organizações e movimentos sociais não alcançaram participação significativa como oposição e que há um maior compromisso do partido 
político das FARC com o que foi acordado em 2016. Conclui-se que o Acordo de Paz não alcançou que o regime político colombiano ofereça 
o suficiente garantias para a participação política da oposição e o exercício da democracia.
PA l Av r A s-c h Av e
Conflito social; participação política; movimentos sociais; liberdade de expressão
1. Introduction 
In November 2016, the Colombian government signed a 
Peace Agreement with the current political party Common 
Alternative Revolutionary Force - FARC (Spanish: Fuerza 
Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común). One of the 
expectations generated by this agreement was to create 
the democratic opening conditions for the expression 
of differences in the country (Point 2 of the Agreement). 
Despite this, in Colombia it has not been possible to 
consolidate a political regime that allows participation and 
protects life (Ángel, Nieto and Giraldo, 2019). The National 
Civil Registry, the Center for Studies in Democracy and 
Electoral Affairs -CEDAE- and the Center for Analysis and 
Public Affairs -CAAP-, thus acknowledge it, stating that in:
 
The Colombian regime, four institutional failures 
- traversed by dynamics of security - persist 
to guarantee the exercise of democracy: a) 
Guarantees for the exercise of the opposition; 
b) Guarantees for freedom of expression; 
c) Guarantees for the association; and d) 
Guarantees for social movements. This is 
observed in the high amount of repression 
actions, with persecution, homicide rates and 
the political genocide of political actors, that 
have restricted even more the political exercise 
of the opposition in Colombia (Londoño, 2016, 
p. 97).
Resolving institutional failures that impede protection of life 
and the democratic exercise of the country, has been one 
of the intentions of the Peace Agreement signed in 2016 
between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP. 
However, the political regime has not allowed adequate 
political participation by the opposition. The Colombian 
State continues to develop practices in which the lack of 
guarantees for the exercise of democracy persists, such as 
the stigmatization of the opposition, the threat and murder 
of social leaders in various areas of the country (Ángel, 
Nieto and Giraldo, 2019). The new FARC political party 
has had to assimilate that participation in politics and the 
struggle to consolidate peace imply sabotage problems of 
the process, both by the State and the government at the 
head of the Democratic Center party, a party that assumed 
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the banner of representing the population that does not 
believe in dialogues with the FARC (Losada and Liendo, 
2016; Rey, 2015).
In Colombia, through the Peace Agreement signed in 2016, 
the need to make not only formal changes but also to allow 
the conditions for political participation of the opposition 
is recognized. However, this recognition has not met its 
materialization, on the contrary, the selective murders of 
social leaders throughout the country have increased (El 
Tiempo, 2019; Indepaz, 2019). The political participation of 
the opposition in Colombia cannot be analyzed outside the 
social context of the country, in which there is evidence 
of a political regime that supports the systematic and 
generalized violation of human rights. Poverty, inequality, 
corruption, and environmental deterioration are the 
correlate of the difficulties that the participation in politics 
has, especially for the rural communities of the country, 
which have been the most affected.
 
This research article raises the question: Does the signing of 
the Peace Agreement, in 2016, achieve that the Colombian 
political regime provides guarantees for the exercise of 
democracy, expressed in guarantees of exercising the 
opposition, freedom of expression, union association and 
social movements? To answer this question, firstly, the 
elements of discussion on the issue of political opposition are 
addressed, and secondly, how this is carried out in Colombia 
after the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016 between 
the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia-People’s Army FARC EP, currently the 
political party Common Alternative Revolutionary Force 
(Spanish: Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común) –
FARC. As a working hypothesis, it is considered that the 
Colombian political regime has not provided sufficient 
guarantees for the participation and exercise of democracy 
and that the current government has allowed the conditions 
for the political, social and armed conflict to be sharpened.
The article makes an important contribution to the novel 
interpretation of a historical moment in which Colombian 
society seeks peaceful solutions to the political, social and 
armed conflict, despite the fact that the current government 
persists in sabotaging what was signed in 2016 in the 
Peace Agreement and maintains a regime in which political 
participation is limited and the opposition is penalized, even 
with the death of social leaders.
2. Methodology
The method of analysis adopted is interpretive and inductive, 
with a focus on the political participation of the opposition 
in a broad sense and not only focused on the analysis as an 
opposition political party; this is to account as the research 
objective, namely, to determine if the Peace Agreement 
signed in 2016 allows that the Colombian political regime 
provides guarantees for the exercise of democracy, 
expressed in guarantees to exercise opposition, freedom of 
expression, union association and social movements.
The analytical phases of the process were developed in the 
following order; first, a consultation of research aimed at 
explaining the exercise of opposition political participation 
in a broad sense, without restricting the opposition to one 
or more political parties, with emphasis on the FARC party 
since it was the signatory of the Peace Agreement; second, 
news and data were gathered on movements and social 
leaders throughout the country. Then, the information 
obtained was critically analyzed considering a) Guarantees 
for the exercise of the opposition; b) Guarantees for 
freedom of expression; c) Guarantees for the association; 
and d) Guarantees for social movements. In this last 
case, an emphasis on the communities in rural areas was 
placed, considering that the Peace Agreement assumes an 
important commitment to them.
The news tracking was carried out through a qualitative 
analysis matrix to identify the most relevant ones that 
would explain and account for the research objective. For 
this analysis, national media such as El Tiempo, El Espectador, 
Semana Magazine, and FARC and other social organizations 
statements on this issue of political participation were 
reviewed.
3. Results and Discussion
Political opposition is a fundamental right and is not limited 
only to political parties and movements. This right extends 
to all citizens and, therefore, all citizens are empowered to 
participate in the control of political power (Netherlands 
Institute for Multiparty Democracy-NIMD, 2019). The 
political opposition is not limited to the work carried 
out in the Congress of the Republic. The exercise of the 
opposition occurs in a broader framework determined 
by context variables, including the existing political party 
system, electoral processes, social equality, existence of 
-cultural, regional, political- pluralism among others (NIMD, 
2019).
An important improvement of the 1991 Constitution was 
to establish the role of the opposition at the institutional 
level (Giraldo, 2014), and it is elevated to a fundamental right 
by the Status of the Opposition (NIMD, 2019). After the 
signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016, Colombian society 
hoped that the political regime would provide guarantees 
for the exercise of democracy, which can be expressed 
in guarantees of exercise of the opposition, freedom 
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of expression, union association and social movements; 
so hereunder it is shown and discussed what has been 
evidenced in the real state of each one of these aspects.
3.1. Guarantees of exercise of the opposition
In Colombia, an anti-opposition practice predominates 
excluding and marginalizing from the political arena the 
initiatives that different social movements and forces of 
the country seek to express in pursuit of the required 
transformations. This anti-opposition state contrast with 
experiences of incorporation into political life, such as 
those reported by:
All opposition groups who fought during 
the conflict ended occupying positions of 
responsibility in new emerged governments 
after the Peace Agreements, this in the cases of 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, South 
Africa, Tajikistan, Sierra Leona, South Sudan, 
Burundi, Indonesia and Nepal (Fisas, 2010, p. 5)
In order to understand the difficulties that the political 
participation of the opposition continues to have in 
Colombia after the Peace Agreement, the works of 
Manning (2004) may be of interest, who has studied the 
armed opposition groups in political parties, comparing the 
cases of Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique. Manning (2004) 
argues that all transitions from war to peace, mediated by 
democratization processes, present two major types of 
organizational challenges: those that imply adjustments in 
the relationships between elites, and those that require 
changes in which the parties try to attract a massive 
tracking, called collective incentive strategies. The specific 
mix of challenges is influenced by institutional factors, 
international intervention, and historical context, among 
others.
The current Colombian government has used warlike 
language that makes the transition from conflict to peace 
difficult. Because electoral politics requires a different set 
of skills than those required in times of conflict, a transition 
from confrontation can change the sources of organizational 
power and authority. Not only the institutional configuration 
of the political arena, but also the substantial outcome of 
the peace agreement influences the probability that the 
parties are willing and are able to invest in the new rules of 
the game (Manning, 2004).
In Colombia, the institutional design makes it difficult 
for all social groups that are separate from the interests 
of the ruling political regime to participate into politics. 
In this regard, Blattman (2008), in his analysis of the war 
and political participation in Uganda, argues that the social 
sciences have yet to produce a theory that is standard and 
empirically supported on political participation.
The violence of war creates grievances that increase the 
inherent value that individuals place on political expression, 
motivating them to increase community leadership. This 
interpretation may explain, at least in part, why the FARC 
remains committed to the Peace Agreement in the middle 
of post-conflict violence. And this explanation is not 
something minor, as other experiences of peace processes 
in the world indicate that of 38 peace agreements signed 
between 1988 and 1998, 31 did not last more than three 
years (Pearlman, 2009).
In the Colombian case, the historical review has shown that 
the difficulties in being part of the opposition have to do 
with State policies (Guarín, 2006). The peace processes that 
culminated in the demobilization of some insurgent groups, 
and their participation through institutional channels, 
marked Colombian politics during the first part of the 
1990s. The guerrillas of the 1970s and 1980s succeeded 
in questioning power structures and placing fundamental 
issues such as human rights, democracy, justice, peace, and 
militarization on the national agenda (Flórez and  Valenzuela, 
1997).
This Colombian dynamic of the 1990s coincides with 
the analyzes of Welsh (1994), who, when comparing the 
processes of political transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe, finds that regardless of the mode of transition, the 
concept of negotiation is crucial to understand the peace 
process. Welsh’s argument is based on the assumption that 
negotiators need to reach some agreement, but at the same 
time want to settle on favorable terms themselves (Welsh, 
1994).
These analyzes contrast with one of the underlying 
assumptions of much of the literature on transitions, 
according to which, the way in which new regimes are 
created has important implications for the stability of the 
emerging polyarchy. These transition modes are generally 
distinguished according to the process through which 
the incumbents are replaced by the opposition force. 
Roughly, there are transitions from above (transformation / 
transaction / reform), transitions from below (substitution / 
rupture / rupture), and transitions where the regime and the 
opposition play a role almost the same in the transformation 
system (translocation /elimination). Considering the 
different patterns of negotiation, contributes to a better 
understanding of the transition process, allowing to 
distinguish between different stages of the transition 
process without having to relying solely on specific events 
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such as foundational elections. For Welsh (1994), different 
stages of the transition process are defined by different 
modes of conflict resolution.
In this approach, the successful transition process towards 
democratic political government involves three stages. 
First, the liberalization of the authoritarian regime is 
accompanied by declines in the use of order and imposition 
as the prevailing modes of conflict resolution. Second, 
as the transition progresses to the elimination of the 
old regime and the institutionalization of a new political 
system, negotiation and commitment emerge as the main 
characteristics of decision making. Finally, the consolidation 
of the transition is distinguished by the predominance of 
competition and cooperation as the predominant means of 
conflict resolution.
In Colombia, where with the signing of the Peace Agreement 
in 2016 the third stage noted above was evidenced, 
the current government refuses to make the changes 
promised. Additionally, the efforts of Colombian society 
and the international community have been insufficient. In 
the case of society, both because of its silencing enforced 
by various actors, and because of the violence exercised 
against the opposition forces. And in the case of the 
international community because there has not been 
enough dissemination and follow-up on what was agreed.
Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) point out that 
understanding the motivations of combatants can shed 
light on the origins and evolution of these conflicts. And 
it also helps in the evaluation of conflict resolution and 
reconstruction strategies in the post-conflict period. If 
insurgent armies have been forged through the promise of 
resource rents from mineral extraction, peacemaking may 
depend on the ability of outside actors to buy the support 
of potential saboteurs. If these armies have motivated 
participation by mobilizing popular discontent towards 
government policies, post-conflict agreements must give 
a more serious consideration to the establishment of 
institutional arrangements focused on discrimination, 
oppression, and inequality.
From the findings of Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) it 
is possible to deduce that in the Colombian case there is 
a greater commitment from the now FARC political party 
with the Peace Agreement due to its dissatisfaction with a 
political regime that sustains inequality, the environmental 
crisis and poverty. They also imply that the discontent, when 
presented through individuals in a particular social class or 
ethnic group, provides the basis for the mobilization and 
the initiation of violence against the State. The reluctance 
of the Colombian government to comply with the Peace 
Agreement contrasts with the firm position of the FARC.
Pearlman (2009) affirms that where parties kept saboteurs 
at bay, as in Guatemala and South Africa, bloody years gave 
way to successful transitions to peace and democracy; 
while where the saboteurs were successful, as in Angola 
and Rwanda, the violence that occurred after the failure of 
the agreement was more horrible than the previous one. 
In Colombia, the current government party, Democratic 
Center party, tries to make the Peace Agreement signed in 
2016 fail. The rhetorical strategies used by the Democratic 
Center party have generated that the public opinion 
understands the peace dialogues within the framework of 
the warmongering interpretation, which leads to a radical 
denial of the project of ending the conflict through dialogue. 
To understand negotiations as a confrontation is to move 
away from the approach assumed by the process and 
introduce a discussion in the public sphere that separates 
the debate from fundamental issues, such as the contents of 
the agreements (Olave and Cediel, 2015).
In the Colombian case, the acts of intolerance against 
the emerging FARC party in the cities of Armenia, Yumbo 
and Cali, prior to the first round of presidential elections 
of the 2018-2022 period, showed that the exercise of 
violence against the political opponent did not only belong 
to the daily terrain, through killing social leaders and ex-
combatants: but it is also exercised in the field of electoral 
politics (Casey, 2018).
Pearlman (2009) asserts that a peace process is a sustained 
effort to negotiate a lasting solution to a prolonged conflict 
between States and/or non-state groups.  Actors dissatisfied 
with the terms of an agreement engage in a sabotaging 
behavior, unless third parties suppress, accommodate, or 
co-opt them as required to address these actors toward 
greedy, limited, or total goals. Saboteurs use violence 
because it is more effective than negotiations in forcing 
democracies to give up territory. Saboteurs plan attacks to 
undermine trust. In Colombia, despite the intensity of the 
sabotage of what was agreed by the Democratic Center 
party, former FARC combatants continue to affirm their 
commitment to the consolidation of sustainable and lasting 
peace, outlined in the 2016 Agreement.
While the FARC has shown its commitment to the 
transformations that the country needs to overcome its 
humanitarian crisis (Zonacero.com, 2019), the studies by 
Mora (2017) and Olave and Cediel (2015) show how the 
political parties that have historically governed , generated 
and promoted armed conflicts, in different worldwide 
experiences oppose the peace accords and sabotage them, 
it is evident in the case of the Democratic Center party in 
Colombia.
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3.2. Guarantees for freedom of expression
Murder is one of the most common ways of violating 
freedom of expression in Colombia, this last one is enshrined 
as one of the fundamental rights in article 20 of the 1991 
Political Constitution, in which, in a formal way, “Everyone 
is guaranteed freedom to express and disseminate their 
thoughts and opinions, to inform and receive truthful and 
impartial information, and to found mass media. These are 
free and have social responsibility. The right to rectification 
under conditions of equity is guaranteed. There will be no 
censorship”.
Although it is recognized that freedom of expression is 
a fundamental pillar for the construction of a democratic 
society - according to the Constitutional Court, 2013, 
sentence T-256, magistrate Jorge Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub 
(Arboleda, 2014); In Colombia, freedom of expression 
is violated through threats, kidnappings, assassinations 
against journalists and social communicators (Londoño, 
2016; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica –CNMH, 
2015, Fundación Para la Libertad de Prensa –FLIP, 2019). 
Historically, the Colombian State has been an instrument 
that concentrates violence and channels it to eliminate 
the opposition (Revollo, 2018; Giraldo, 1994; Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica -CNMH, 2013). The Peace 
Agreement signed in 2016, meant the recognition, by the 
Colombian Government, of the need to carry out profound 
transformations in the State to generate conditions for 
freedom of expression and the implementation of different 
kind entrepreneurships (Botello-Peñaloza and Guerrero-
Rincón, 2017; García-Macías, Zerón-Felix and Sánchez-Tovar, 
2018; Díaz-Fernández and Echevarría-León, 2016). 
However, the selective murders of social leaders, union 
leaders and communicators, perpetrated by the State or 
with its complicity, in all regions of the country (El Tiempo, 
2019), have targeted not only political opponents belonging 
to the FARC party but also social expressions that disagree 
with the economy policy of the country (Indepaz, 2019) 
(Figure 1).
Ávila (2017), in a column in the newspaper El País, affirms 
that in the country the collusion between political parties, 
high courts, the office of the attorney general of Colombia 
and electoral body is so large that opinion can be censored. 
The Press Freedom Foundation -FLIP (Spanish: Fundación 
para la libertad de prensa), in the “Report on the state 
of press freedom in Colombia 2019. Silence and pretend, 
the usual censorship “ evidence that despite the signing of 
the 2016 Peace Agreement the transformations have not 
been performed to generate conditions for freedom of 
expression. FLIP (2019) document: 
• 515 attacks on the country’s press, of which 137 were 
threats, 4 were kidnappings and 2 homicides. 
• 66 journalists were attacked during days of national 
strike.
• 125 murders of journalists, out of 159, go unpunished
• 15 bills seek to limit expression on the Internet
• 1,100 people were fired from the media communication 
in Colombia
• 66 cases of judicial harassment that affected 75 
journalists
3. 3. Guarantees for the association
 and social movements
In Colombia, the government promotes a context of 
systematic violation and generalized guarantees for the 
union association and social movements, which shows a 
disinterest in democracy and peace (Castrillón-Torres and 
Cadavid-Ramírez, 2018, p. 151). Murillo’s studies (2019) on 
the prospects of the Peace Agreement conclude that the 
way the government creates a climate of uncertainty that 
extends to other urgent topics from the official agenda: 
it does not consider the  – nstitutional, economic and 
human –  resources available and does not operate under 
a democratic logic.
The “Report on Human Rights Violations of trade unionists 
in Colombia, 2016-2018. The peace is built with guarantees 
for freedom of association”, published in May 2019 by the 
National Union School, shows that, after the signing of 
the Peace Agreement in 2016, violence Anti-union is not 
an outdated phenomenon and continues to be a violation 
of the human rights of trade unionists, a serious  obstacle 
to freedom of association and a way of treatment based 
on exclusion and stigmatization (Colorado, Trujillo, Ortiz 
and Amado, 2019). According to this, Peace Agreement of 
2016 has not meant the overcoming of persecution and 
violence against unions and trade unionists, on the contrary, 
homicides have increased (Table 1).
The 2016 Peace Agreement has not meant that the 
organizations and social movements may dissent from 
the political regime, and, therefore, help lay the bases for 
democracy and peacebuilding. From this perspective, it is 
valid to consider that, for the democratic construction, the 
opposition is necessary since it allows a thoughtful search 
for social progress, with the contribution of the expression 
of a true social and political pluralism that drives social 
longings in public policies (De la Cruz and Ariza, 2017).
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Figure 1. Social leaders and human rights defenders murdered in Colombia in 2018
Source: Indepaz Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (Spanish: Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz) (2019)
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On May 7th 2018, 108 social and human rights defenders 
organizations from the Colombian south and of national 
order raised, by means of a statement, their request towards 
the international community to make the necessary efforts 
in order to stop the persecution and attack suffered by 
human rights defenders and leaders and women leaders of 
the Colombian social movement (Coordinador Nacional 
Agrario - CNA, 2018). The statement brings to light the 
“state terrorism against the social movement and its 
historical genocidal practice, against the social leaders and 
women leaders” (CNA, 2018, p. 1).
It is not possible to expect that the Colombian State 
acknowledge that there are no guarantees for expressions 
of the country’s social movements. In Colombia, rural 
organizations and social movements in the country, have 
been the most affected by the political, social, and armed 
conflict, they find in the State the main obstacle for the 
achievement of peace (ONIC, 2018; CRIC, 2019). This 
consideration is supported by CEPAL (2018) and FAO 
(2018) studies, according to these multilateral organizations 
structural poverty in rural sectors remains alarmingly high. 
CEPAL estimations (2018), point out that in 2016 the 
percentages of the population in situation of rural poverty 
and extreme rural poverty in Latin America reached 
48.6% and 22.5%, respectively. These levels are considered 
extremely high (FAO, 2018) and hinder the challenges 
implied for the country because of the growing rise of the 
digital economy in the world (Calle-Álvarez and Sánchez-
Castro, 2017).
In Colombia, reducing rural poverty can be accomplished 
through a rural Territorial Development approach (FAO, 
2018), as stipulated in the Peace Agreement, which allows 
achieving less food insecurity, reduce migratory pressure 
on urban areas, reduce social unrest and avoid the 
degradation of ecosystems; moreover, that it boosts the 
productive capacity and the economic contribution of the 
rural poor (Sánchez-Jiménez, Nieto-Gómez and Giraldo-
Díaz, 2018). Despite having signed the Peace Agreement in 
2016, which discerns this development approach, the State 
guides policies that exacerbate the political, social, and 
environmental problems of rural populations (Alzate, 2018).
It seems that the Colombian government assumed two 
ways of acting within the framework of negotiations, since 
in Havana spun a rhetorical discourse that gave shape to a 
difficult dialogue between two historically opposed parties 
without allowing the emergence of creative agreements for 
the reconciliation; on the other hand, in Colombia the same 
government and in the full exercise of its governmentality, 
it unravels and does not recognize what was agreed. With 
the Peace Agreement, the hopes of rural populations 
emerged, those mired in multidimensional rural poverty 
(FAO, 2018). Although the FARC have committed to what 
was agreed, throughout and across the country these hopes 
are interrupted by state violence (Indepaz, 2019; ONIC, 
2019). The Colombian State does not help to overcome 
poverty and the humanitarian crisis of rural societies, on 
the contrary, state policies sharpen them.
Table 1. 
Violations of life, liberty and integrity committed against trade unionists in Colombia, 2016-2018
Type of violation 2016 2017 2018 General total
Threats 202 137 172 511
Homicides 20 22 34 76
Harassment 30 26 8 64
Attacked with or without injuries 18 17 10 45
Arbitary detention 5 9 - 14
Illegal break-in 8 1 1 10
Enforced disappearance - 1 3 4
Forced displacement 1 1 2 4
Torture 2 1 1 4
General total 286 215 231 732
Source: Colorado et al. (2019, p. 22), based on Human Rights Information System (Spanish: Sistema de 
Información en Derechos Humanos), Sinderh.
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